The COW Token Vote Delegation Program is designed to enhance the governance process of the COW token ecosystem by allowing token holders to delegate their voting rights to their preferred delegates. This program aims to increase participation, ensure informed decision-making, and provide a more efficient governance mechanism. As part of this initiative, we propose the creation of the CoW DAO Delegate Council, a group of nominated delegates representing diverse interests within the CoW ecosystem.
Rationale:
Increased Participation: Many token holders may not have the time or expertise to participate in every vote. Delegation allows them to stay involved without the need to actively engage in every decision.
Expert Decision-Making: Delegates with specific expertise can make more informed decisions on behalf of token holders.
Efficiency: Introducing more efficient means of reaching quorum and making decisions, while keeping complete control and independence for individual delegators to override their delegate’s decision.
Balanced Representation: The CoW DAO Delegate Council ensures that various aspects and interests in the CoW ecosystem are represented in the governance process.
CoW DAO Delegate Council:
The CoW DAO Delegate Council will consist of 10 nominated delegates, representing diverse categories within the CoW ecosystem:
Solvers
Institutional investors
Core team members
Integrators
Traders
Community members
DEX and MEV researchers
To ensure balanced representation, no more than two delegates will be nominated under each category.
Council Responsibilities:
Actively participate in governance discussions and vote on proposals
Represent the interests of their respective categories and delegators
Provide regular updates and communicate with the broader CoW community
Contribute expertise and insights to inform decision-making processes
Collaborate with other council members to reach consensus on critical issues
Council Term and Rotation:
Defining a term for council seats and a rotation scheme is important to ensure that fresh contributors and ideas are introduced while enabling the rotation of less active delegates.
At this early stage of the program, it is hard to evaluate the appropriate term and rotation scheme.
CoW DAO and the Delegate Council will revisit this topic 12 months following the approval of this proposal to set a concrete fixed term and rotation scheme.
A staggered rotation will be considered to ensure continuity and fresh perspectives.
The process for re-nomination or election of council members will be defined.
Council Decision-Making and Interaction with the Broader Governance Process:
The scope of the council’s decision-making authority is defined by the voting power that each of its members acquires from delegators.
CoW DAO proposals will continue to be fully public. Council members are expected to engage and express their opinions on new public proposals and cast their votes based on their accumulated voting power.
CoW DAO may consider using the Delegate Council for making decisions or acting on behalf of the DAO in specific topics that require fast decision-making or confidentiality. Any additional authority will be granted by CoW DAO in a separate proposal, and based of the success of the initial rollout of the Delegate Council.
In case additional responsibilities or authority are introduced to the council by CoW DAO in future proposals, quorum requirements, voting thresholds, and mechanisms for council meetings and votes will be established.
Council Accountability and Transparency:
Council members will disclose any potential conflicts of interest.
Public records of council meetings, discussions, and votes will be maintained.
Channels for community feedback and input to the council will be established.
Mechanisms for removing or replacing council members, if necessary, will be implemented.
Council Member Nomination:
Initially, the Council will not have any extra mandate extending its authority beyond the voting power gained from COW token holders and delegators. Therefore, getting nominated to the council is mainly about members taking more accountability and responsibility for staying engaged and involved. An additional benefit for council members is the increased visibility that can lead to more delegators choosing council members as their delegates.
Being a council member will NOT be a requirement for becoming a delegate, which will remain completely permissionless.
The Delegate Council mandate will be fully acquired directly from token holders. Therefore, to simplify the nomination process, it is proposed that the initial nomination process will be managed by the Grants DAO committee.
The initial council members cohort will be nominated using the following process:
The Grants DAO committee will open an application form and process applications.
Applications will be screened according to the criteria below and a subjective evaluation of candidates’ areas of expertise, knowledge, and contributions.
10 nominated council members will be announced.
Criteria for community-nominated delegates:
Self-delegate a minimum of 10,000 COW tokens.
Self-limit voting power to 30 million tokens (by transitively delegating anything above the agreed threshold).
Undergo a vetting process (e.g., expertise, reputation, being active in the COW ecosystem as a solver, trader, forum discussions, etc.).
New Delegation Features:
This program integrates new features into the existing Snapshot.org platform, making CoW DAO one of the first to utilize these advancements.
Split Delegation: Split Delegation allows delegators to split their voting weight among multiple delegates.
Transitive Delegation: Supports transitive delegation (A → B, B → C, C = A + B), enabling more complex delegation chains.
Conclusion:
With the introduction of the CoW DAO Delegate Council, new delegation features, and a nomination process, we aim to create a diverse, balanced, and effective governance structure for the CoW ecosystem. By fostering participation, improving public discourse, and enhancing the decision-making process, the delegation program will contribute to the long-term success and growth of the CoW DAO.
We believe the Delegation Program is a well-conceived initiative that has the potential to enhance the governance of the CoWDAO by introducing expert decision-making and increasing efficiency.
A smaller council, such as the proposed 10-member CoWDAO Delegate Council with representatives from various categories within the DAO, can improve governance effectiveness. This structure allows for the engagement of delegates with specific expertise in different aspects of the CoW ecosystem, ensuring that each delegate contributes valuable insights and perspectives.
karpatkey supports this direction and will apply for a seat if this proposal passes. We believe this initiative has the potential to contribute to the long-term success and growth of the CoWDAO. We look forward to seeing its positive impact on our community. However, we suggest one improvement to the proposal:
We would like to see a process where, instead of the Grants Committee selecting the 10 members, a more decentralized approach is taken, where the committee acts as a screening body, and present a list of 10 candidates for DAO approval.
Great proposal—we’re excited to see it go live.
I had a few points on the program’s design:
Rationale: Increased Participation. I expect that though there may be an initial spike in participation due to delegation, it will likely drop over time without incentives. If the council can attract the majority of the delegated voting power by introducing explicit expectations, this effect may actually be limited.
Rationale: Expert Decision-Making. Experts tend to have a higher opportunity cost to participate. Retaining their interest may be harder if they don’t directly benefit from the protocol.
CoW DAO Delegate Council: Balanced Representation: Is the number of seats a fair representation of each group’s relative interests? Should we be concerned if a single trader is elected but two core team members are elected, granting them double the opportunity to acquire voting power?
CoW DAO Delegate Council: Council Responsibilities: What happens if they don’t participate? Who monitors and enforces these rules?
Council Decision-Making and Interaction with the Broader Governance Process: Is there no concern that a council election will concentrate voting power in the council? What happens if delegators do not re-delegate when council members leave?
Criteria for community-nominated delegates: Self-delegation and self-limiting criteria are really useful. I wonder how this will intersect with the relative power of each group in the council if everyone aims to maximise their delegation. In the above example, the two core team members will have a 60m limit versus the trader’s 30m. Perhaps the limit should apply to categories instead of members (though this may introduce an incentive to misreport).
I’m also a fan of split and transitive delegation. Excited to see these in use.
Overall, it’s a great proposal. It’s simple yet introduces some innovation without adding risk.
It is still subject to the usual issues with delegated token voting regarding apathy and principle-agent problems, but those shouldn’t be an issue initially.
Given the maturity of the delegate ecosystem, I’d introduce a review in 3-6 months rather than 12 months to determine if the participant’s existing incentives are enough to produce the behaviours you expect.
We’d be happy to help once you begin considering incentives.
Thanks for your feedback, let me share my thoughts.
I don’t expect that participation of individual token holder will increase meaningfully if at all. I expect improvement in participation in two areas:
Forum discussion - I expect improvement in relevant and thoughtful discussion (mainly from delegates).
Voting - I expect that more users participate indirectly - by delegating. Therefore making quorum easier to achieve.
This is true today and will likely remain true even after the proposed delegation program launches. However, among the experts already involved in the DAO and protocol, we ideally want to get a few of them more committed to governance by nominating them for the CoW DAO Delegate Council, giving them more delegated voting power, and thus more influence on decision-making.
Quantifying “balanced representation” is very challenging. Much will depend on the actual candidates who apply. A good initial target is “diverse representation,” even if it’s not perfectly balanced. Improvements can be made over time. Importantly, council nomination doesn’t give direct voting power—this can only be acquired through delegators.
Good question, which I don’t have a very concrete answer to at the moment. I proposed rotating council members, and it makes sense to rotate out members who don’t find the time to participate meaningfully.
One feature of the new delegate registry that I need to explore further is expiring delegations. Potentially, we can require a 2-year expiry as a binding requirement for getting nominated to the council.
It’s quite difficult to define exact categories and the power each should have. This is why I believe it’s best to leave voting power allocation to the delegators. While the allocation may not be perfect, claiming to define the correct voting power allocation by category runs counter to the principles of decentralized governance, in my opinion.
Thanks again for your insightful feedback! Let’s continue the discussion and refine these ideas together.
