CIP Draft: Replenishing the CoW Team Grant Allocation

title: < Replenishing the CoW Team Grant Allocation >
author: < @Kowrigan>
status: **Draft**
created: 2025/12/15

Edit Dec. 18,2025

Simple Summary

This proposal asks CoW DAO to:

  • Replenish the CoW Team Grant Allocation with 5% of the total COW supply (50,000,000 COW) via a new four-year streaming allocation coming from the allocation of the managed treasury in connection to the mandate of CIP-62 CoW DAO Safe 0xcA771eda0c70aA7d053aB1B25004559B918FE662; and
  • Authorise the Core Treasury Team (per CIP-62) to deploy up to $15M in stablecoins over time to buy COW on the open market and transfer those tokens into the Team Grant Allocation, targeting an additional ~5% of total supply (up to 50M COW).

The result is a 10% long-term incentive capacity for core contributors (similar to the previous CIP-76 request), but implemented as:

  • 5% from DAO treasury CoW DAO Safe → streamed to the Team Grant Allocation, and
  • ~5% accumulated via market purchases.

This structure aims to maintain strong contributor alignment while directly addressing dilution and issuance concerns raised during the CIP-76 discussion and vote.

Motivation

1. Context: CoW Team Grant Allocation and CIP-76 feedback

Since the 2022 spin-off from Gnosis DAO, CoW DAO has relied on a Team Grant Allocation Committee (the “Committee”) managing a dedicated pool of COW to align long-term contributors with the DAO’s success. At TGE, the DAO approved a 15% team allocation managed by this Committee.

This program has helped attract new talents and grow the team from initially 22 to 46 members.

Over time, most of the initial grants have either fully vested or are close to vesting, and the team has continued to grow. The original Team Grant Allocations were structured as 4-year linear vesting and will largely terminate by February 2026, meaning that the initial pool is now almost fully exhausted. As detailed in CIP-76, only ~26M COW (~2.6% of total supply) remains uncommitted (excluding already-awarded but still vesting grants), which is not sufficient to support multi-year retention of existing contributors and the recruitment of new talent.

The initial proposal for a COW token top-up by the core team in form of CIP-76 (“Continued funding for development services – Service Agreement No 5”) failed, as many token holders expressed their concerns regarding COW token dilution and selling pressure for existing token holders in case the DAO approves the 100M top-up and expressed their desire to tie new incentives to buybacks / market purchases rather than only internal reallocations.

This CIP responds by proposing a hybrid token + buyback structure.

2. Why a renewed Team Grant Allocation is needed

CoW DAO’s mission is to make digital-asset trading provably fair, cost-efficient and MEV-resistant. Delivering on that in the coming years requires:

  • Retaining and rewarding the core engineering, research, product, BD, design and operations talent that built the current protocol suite;
  • Attracting new senior contributors in a hyper-competitive market (L2s, L1s, CEX spin-offs) where equity-like upside is standard; and
  • Ensuring contributors have skin in the game and are incentivised to create long-term COW value, not just short-term cash flow.

Without a refreshed, clearly scoped Team Grant Allocation, the DAO risks:

  • Losing key contributors as existing grants fully vest,
  • Being outbid by better-funded ecosystems, and
  • Mis-aligning incentives toward short-term contract work rather than long-term value creation.

3. Why this structure is different from CIP-76

The key differences compared to the rejected CIP-76 grant request:

  • Smaller immediate allocation

    • Rejected CIP-76: single 100M COW streaming top-up (10% of supply) to the Committee.
    • This CIP: 50M COW (5%) via streaming + a budget for market purchases of ~50M COW over time.
  • Half of the new incentive capacity is funded via market purchases

    • Up to $15M in stables (from the DAO managed treasury under CIP-62’s mandate) is earmarked for buying COW on the open market (through market orders, OTC or through derivatives with Market Makers), transferring those tokens into the COW Team Grant Allocation.
    • At today’s market prices (~$0.20/COW), ~50M COW (~5% of supply) corresponds to $10M, hence justifying a higher stable allocation that will be used until 50M COW are repurchased.
  • This hybrid structure permits to drastically diminish dilution risks while creating a constant buying pressure on the market.

Specification

1. Overview

This CIP establishes a Core Contributor Incentive Capacity of up to 10% of total COW supply for the next multi-year cycle, implemented as:

  1. On-chain Grant Streaming (5% / 50M COW)
    A 50,000,000 COW streaming allocation from CoW DAO main treasury CoW DAO Safe to the Team Grant Allocation Safe over four years.
  2. Market Purchase Program (target ~5% / ~50M COW)
    A mandate for the Core Treasury Team (CIP-62) to use up to $15M in stablecoins to acquire COW from the market and transfer purchased tokens to the Team Grant Allocation Safe over time.

The amount requested is justified due to:

  • 17 grants concluding in 2026, including the Founders, technical leads (FE, BE, Solver research, Smart Contracts), operational leads (Finance, People Ops) and BD and marketing leads.
  • 18 other team members whose grants will fully vest between 2027 and 2029.
  • New team members, to work on initiatives like internal solver running, BD and community management efforts, Foundation related operations like Treasury and Accounting.

2. Token allocation: 5% streaming top-up

2.1 Amount

  • 50,000,000 COW (5% of total 1,000,000,000 COW supply) will be transferred vested from the Managed Treasury CoW DAO Safe 0xcA771eda0c70aA7d053aB1B25004559B918FE662 for the CoW Team Grant Allocation.

2.2 Vesting mechanics

  • The 50M COW allocation will be vested / streamed linearly over four (4) years via an AllocationModule attached to the DAO Safe, following the same pattern as CIP-76:

    • Vesting start: 1770797115 UNIX time
    • Vesting end: four years after the vesting start (duration of 126144000)
  • Until transferred to the Team Grant Allocation Safe, tokens remain under the direct control of CoW DAO, and unvested amounts can be cancelled by governance at any time.

2.3 Prohibited use of funds. Tokens may not be:

  • Used for operational cash funding of entities,
  • Re-sold by the Committee for stablecoins, or
  • Diverted to non-incentive purposes, except by explicit future CIP.

3. Market Purchase Program: up to $15M → ~5% additional COW

3.1 Budget and scope

  • The Core Treasury Team (per CIP-62) is authorised to use up to $15,000,000 equivalent in stablecoins (e.g. USDC, DAI, USDT, etc) from CoW DAO to purchase up to 50M COW
  • All COW acquired under this program must be transferred to the Team Grant Allocation Safe and become subject to the same grant / vesting policies as other Team Grant Allocation tokens.

3.2 Execution guidelines

The treasury committee will retain flexibility on executing this transaction through open market orders, OTC deals or through private placement with Market Makers.

In the event that the Treasury Committee completes the acquisition of the 50,000,000 COW tokens at a price lower than the maximum budgeted amount, any unspent funds shall be automatically reallocated back to the CoW DAO Core Treasury Managed Treasury.

3.3 Reporting

  • The Treasury Team will include a dedicated subsection in their regular treasury reports (per CIP-62) summarising:
    • Total stables spent under this program,
    • Volume and average acquisition price of purchased COW, and
    • Total COW transferred to the Team Grant Allocation Safe.

4. Team Grant Allocation governance and guardrails

The Team Grant Allocation Committee will continue to administer individual grants, subject to the following principles (some already in practice, now made explicit):

4.1 Transparency

  • At least once per year, the Committee will publish an aggregated transparency report including, at a minimum:
    • Total COW allocated / still available,
    • Number of grantees,
    • Average vesting terms (cliff + duration).
  • Reports will not list individual compensation details but must be sufficient for tokenholders to assess whether the program is aligned and sustainable.

4.2 DAO ultimate control

  • CoW DAO maintains full control over unvested streams as it can reduce, pause, or cancel the streaming allocation via governance.

Rationale

1. Maintaining competitive incentives without over-issuing

A 10% multi-year incentive pool is designed to:

  • Give CoW DAO enough runway to:
    • Retain current Core Team members,
    • Onboard new talents,

Using a 5% streaming allocation + 5% buyback target:

  • Keeps the headline incentive capacity unchanged relative to CIP-76’s 100M request, but
  • Splits the implementation between DAO treasury tokens and market purchases, thus mitigating negative price impact of COW token.

2. Incorporating delegate feedback on dilution and buybacks

During CIP-76, several tokenholders questioned:

  • The optics and timing of a 100M COW top-up,
  • The potential sell-pressure over the next cycle, and
  • The lack of a direct connection between new grants and market purchases / buybacks.

This CIP addresses those points by:

  • Halving the immediate streaming request (5% vs 10%), and
  • Committing to a structured buyback program that:
    • Uses DAO stables to buy tokens from the market,
    • Transfers purchased COW into the incentive pool, and
    • Can be paced to market conditions.

It does not try to embed complex KPI formulas into the grant program itself, in line with feedback that “KPI-inside-the-CIP” is brittle and increases governance overhead without necessarily improving alignment. Instead, performance is reflected in:

  • Who gets a grant at all,
  • Size and duration of individual grants, and
  • The DAO’s ability to terminate streams or adjust the program via future CIPs.

Execution

Note: The exact Safe transaction payload and Tenderly simulation link will be finalised prior to moving this CIP from “Draft” to the Snapshot phase. The intention is described below so that the community can review and comment on the structure.

Safe Transaction Data

(TBD)

Following up on the CIP, sharing here the Core Team’s opinion on why the Market Purchase Program (50M allocation) should not be subject to KPI vesting, but to also linear vesting, from the Treasury wallet post conclusion of the market purchasing.

KPI based vesting is intended to align compensation to output / outcome and incentive align Agents (here Core Team) towards the interests of the Principal (CoW DAO).

We would like to share that since the spin-off no revenue stream has been attributed from the DAO to the Core Team or any legal entity related to the Core Team. In fact, the opposite; all revenue generated by CoW products including protocol and interface always end-up in the DAO Treasury or DAO controlled wallets. This commitment of the Core Team to serve the DAO first can also be seen with the sale of MEV Blocker, which was sold for more than 3M USD, and 100% of that amount was attributed to CoW Foundation’s entities.

At the same time, we do not intend to monetise on any feature built or IP developed, having in place tight IP ownership transfer to CoW Foundation for any past and future work developed under our service agreements.

Lastly, any relevant market KPI (that is not a development / roadmap item, or a BD strategy) is not 100% under the Core Team’s control, leaving the compensation of key developers subject to market dynamics of which we don’t control. IF, however, it’s decided that COW token compensation IS dependent on KPIs, then the overall achievable COW compensation for the core team should be higher than 10%, to account for potential differences in attainment. Giving some examples:

1. Committing to a Revenue target or growth rate - Revenue is accumulated from the volume fee (dependent on volume traded in the UI and Protocol) and surplus generated (by solvers). This means that the Core Team directly cannot control revenue growth and can only indirectly contribute to it through the mechanism design. In extreme cases, the community could vote for a waiver of all fees, and the Core team could not unilaterally veto said decision (as we saw in the prior CIP).

2. Committing to a volume or market share target - Our current opinion is that the DAO should make revenue and profit from its operations, to generate value attributable to token holders (project ongoing). This means that we support initiatives like the volume fee and linking solver rewards to Fees generated, to ensure each network deployed is profitable at a gross margin level. This vision leads to Fees being charged, which penalises volume and, indirectly, market share. As such, a KPI on these variables is counter to the current Core Team’s opinion of where the protocol should aim for.

3. Committing to price target - This would generate a very dangerous incentive, of the Core Team trying to be in contact with Market Makers, or through other means, try to influence the price of the token. In several jurisdictions, this could be considered insider trading given insider knowledge, raising risks to the individuals developing CoW’s products. From another perspective, this would create a double flywheel, as not only would the tokens already received be more valuable, but the core team would then unblock higher token quantity.

From the above, we see more limitations / drawbacks (team chasing KPIs rather than optimising for DAO / token success, uncertainty over token allocation blocking hiring of key talent, among others) than benefits of introducing this KPI based vesting / unlock. This particularly so given the fact that the Core Team has (in its view) always pushed towards maximum benefit accrual at the DAO level, ensuring that all value generated by the protocol is secured at the DAO’s treasury level.

While we acknowledge that this might not go in line with the opinion of some tokenholders, we would like to request that if that is the case, to publicly share for discussion reasonable, specific, and actionable suggestions.

Lastly, to reinforce our stance, the community is free to judge us on our work delivered, and the ultimate word boils down to tokenholders and governance.

Tagging the main contributors to the discussion in the prior topic:
@karolak , @tanglin , @m0xt , @valloderbabo , @cp0x , @sunce86 , @fairlight

2 Likes

My main concern was the dilution effect by unlocking more COW while the already unlocked COW reamining in the treasury were idling there without any use. By using those for teams compensation + using revenue to rebuild the rest of the grant is a great idea which will prevent cow holders from dilution and team still be compensated. Most of us are happy with the theams work so far so I hope that will pass and keep will keep up the good work! Seeing DAO being able to fund the team and all budget organically is a good sign for the future.

2 Likes

I wanted to express my opinion on the project’s development and team payouts accordingly.
KPIs can and should be set independently of market factors. They should, in my opinion, take into account the following:

  1. The CoW team should have a plan for the timeframe surrounding vesting (if you planned to retain the team for four years, then it’s needed for specific purposes). As an example, I can cite Lido’s GOOSE, with a three-year master plan and annual adjustments. The team and tokenholders should see the long-term outlook and what they’re sharing their funds for (which will be diluted by team payouts).

  2. What specific percentage of the total supply to give the team is debatable, and no one can answer it right now, but I believe it depends on the plans. If the solutions the team plans to implement attract funds to the DAO treasury comparable to what the team is requesting, this will be a fair distribution. Of course, it’s difficult to determine future income in advance, but without such calculations, it’s difficult to determine the team’s future contribution.

  3. If such long-term plans are developed, we can implement a hybrid payment scheme based on the results of half-years or the year (depending on the complexity of the plans and how quickly they are implemented) – that is, vesting will be in place initially, and at checkpoints, the DAO will decide whether to continue or reduce payments.

We would like to call attention to the community that a correction was done in the CIP. The initial 5% vesting tranche should be initiated from CoW DAO Safe 0xcA771eda0c70aA7d053aB1B25004559B918FE662.

The Core Treasury (KPK) Managed Treasury will initiate the remaining in-market purchase program. The acquired tokens will be accumulated in a specific sub-safe, and the Treasury team will then be able to stream them from this safe at their discretion, using the same vesting conditions as the initial stream.

We highlight that the impact to circulating supply is nil given that tokens in the sphere of the CoW Foundation (including the CoW KPK Managed Treasury) are not considered circulating supply.

Please see stroked out text replaced by bold text in the initial post.

Thanks for updating the proposal and incorporating some of the feedback. I have a couple of questions:

  1. I’m still struggling to fully justify the ask of 100M tokens. While the current circulating supply is around 545M, the effective circulating supply, excluding tokens held by DAO wallets and not yet distributed, might be closer to 450M. In that context, a 100M allocation represents roughly 22% of the real supply, which is quite significant.

I understand that this allocation might not be used in full, especially considering your past approach of not distributing tokens indiscriminately. Still, the absolute figure feels relatively high.

You mentioned that the incentive structure is in line with fintech industry standards. Could you share more specific data or examples to help assess whether this proposed allocation aligns with typical market levels?

It might also be helpful if @Hasu could share some insights into how incentives are structured in the case of Lido, as a potential point of comparison too.

  1. There are approximately 26 million uncommitted $COW tokens, representing about 2.6% of the total supply? Will these tokens remain under DAO control, and is there any clarity on whether or how they might be allocated in the future?

  2. Regarding the proposed $15M in buybacks: you referenced CIP-62, which only mandated the allocation of 80M $COW tokens to the Core Treasury team for executing specific initiatives.

At the same time, the stated goal of the treasury is to build and maintain a stablecoin reserve of over $24M to ensure a two-year runway. According to the most recent treasury report, current stablecoin holdings (including USD and EUR-denominated assets) are around $20M.

This raises the question: Where is the $15M for the buybacks expected to come from, given the current treasury position and priorities?

I also wonder over what timeframe is the team aiming to accumulate the targeted $50M $COW through buybacks?

4. Your argument that KPIs are not suitable because the core team does not have full control over them could be applied to virtually any business context. In reality, no team ever has 100% control over KPIs - whether it’s trading volume, products sold, revenue, or profit. That uncertainty is inherent to all performance-based systems.

For this reason, I would still prefer to see at least a portion of the allocation made dynamic and linked to well-defined KPIs.

Beyond just accountability, this could help surface the metrics that matter most to stakeholders and foster better alignment between the team’s efforts and what the broader community or investors value.

2 Likes

Hi @cp0x and @m0xt, thanks for the detailed pushback. We’re going to answer each concern head-on, because the decision here is simple: either the DAO renews a credible long-term incentive runway as legacy grants end in February 2026, or we knowingly accept increased attrition risk and slower execution at the exact moment CoW is expanding cross-chain and into new flow types.

What are tokenholders “buying” for the next cycle?

We agree with the core premise: incentives should map to an explicit plan. Internally we’re aligned around a focus that can be communicated plainly:

  • Make the core product “boringly reliable” at scale: higher swap reliability, better routing / solver performance, tighter operational loops, and smoother partner onboarding so we can unlock larger, high-volume integrations.

  • Expand addressable flows: support new asset types (RWA, Prediction Market Tokens; etc.) and order types and deepen multi-chain / cross-chain execution so CoW becomes the default settlement layer across ecosystems.

  • Improve value capture durability: prioritise high-quality flow, sustainable fee capture, and better COW token economics, rather than chasing vanity metrics.

It’s the practical work needed to keep CoW ahead in a market where L2s, infra teams, and well-funded competitors recruit aggressively.

Why not adopt something like Lido’s GOOSE + hard KPI gates?

Two separate ideas are being mixed:

  1. Publishing clear objectives and updating them periodically, we’re aligned with that. Lido’s GOOSE is a good reference for how to make goals legible and reviewable in public.

  2. Turning compensation into KPI-gated cliff events we don’t think that’s the right instrument for this phase of CoW, for one reason: it converts retention into a binary governance risk. The moment you make long-term contributor upside contingent on discrete KPI gates (many of which are materially market-driven), you either (i) set KPIs so soft they don’t constrain anything, or (ii) set them hard and accidentally create an incentive program that top talent discounts heavily (or avoids entirely).

Instead, this proposal already bakes in a strong “checkpoint” mechanism that’s often overlooked:

  • Each 5% streams (the initial one and the one resulting from the buy back) are cancellable/pausable by governance while unvested. Tokens stay under DAO control until streamed.

  • The Committee is subject to annual aggregated transparency reporting.

  • The buyback leg is reported explicitly in treasury reporting.

So the DAO has an always-on “stop button” without turning retention into a coin-flip around a single metric.

Allocation size & benchmarking

Two clarifications:

First: the current draft is not “100M streamed now.”

It’s 50M (5%) streamed over 4 years, plus an authorisation for up to $15M in stablecoins to buy COW over time targeting up to ~50M COW purchased (market-dependent), which will be streamed in the future.

Second: mixing “effective circulating” with “allocation size” leads to the wrong conclusion.

Only the initial streamed portion is issuance from DAO reserves; the buyback portion is non-dilutive by design (it moves tokens from the market into the incentive pool).
So the right lens is: 5% gradual stream with a governance kill-switch + a market-purchase program that directly addresses dilution optics and creates structural buy pressure.

In addition, token incentive design varies wildly, but two grounded reference points:

  • CoW’s own baseline: at TGE, the DAO approved a 15% team allocation managed via the committee model. This CIP is about restoring the runway as that program reaches exhaustion and major grants complete vesting by Feb 2026.

  • Market practice (broadly): employee pools in startups are commonly modeled in mid-single digits to mid-teens and show an average of 24% allocated to the team (the point being: serious projects reserve real upside for builders). pulley.com

What happens to the ~26M uncommitted tokens from the prior pool?

They remain within the Team Grant Allocation framework and should be treated as first-line runway before the DAO meaningfully “taps” the new stream (practically: FIFO usage). The key point is: the new stream is not a blank cheque; it’s a replenishment mechanism that can be slowed/paused if the existing pool plus buybacks are sufficient.

Where does the $15M for buybacks come from, and over what timeframe we’d reach the buyback target?

The buyback authorisation is intentionally “up to” $15M over time, not a single immediate spend.

The current Treasury allocation is nearer to $25M in stables, so the treasury team can either use that reserved assets or inflows from revenue to fund the purchases.

So the correct commitment is:

  • Buybacks must be paced so they do not undermine runway targets, timeframe to be defined with KPK (probably around 1 year)

  • Execution remains under the Core Treasury mandate and must be reported (spent, average price, tokens transferred).

  • If the full 50M target is reached under budget, unspent funds return to the managed treasury (already specified in the draft).

Why we’re firm on the structure

We’re not trying to “win an argument.” We’re protecting the DAO from a very predictable failure mode: grants end → retention weakens → execution slows → partners choose other rails → tokenholders pay the price anyway, just more slowly and with less control.

This proposal is the balanced path because it simultaneously:

  1. Restores incentive runway as the old program sunsets in Feb 2026,

  2. Cuts immediate issuance vs the rejected “all-streamed” approach,

  3. Adds a buyback leg that directly addresses dilution optics and can be paced,

  4. Keeps the DAO’s hard power intact (pause/cancel stream; annual reporting).

Process note: given the engagement and the fact that the draft already incorporates the key structural feedback (split stream + buybacks + reporting + safeguards), the intent is to move this to vote on Friday, 9 January 2026, in its current format.

4 Likes