CIP-54 Dissolve Project Blanc bonding pool

Some comments about what, in my opinion, would be the “correct” formal process. I would strongly recommend that these steps, in some form, are also described within the text of the CIP.

(1) Within the text of the CIP, the Project Blanc team asks the core team to deny-list their associated solver addresses. Assuming the core team verifies the request with the Project Blanc team via the various communication methods that are currently being used, the core team initiates the deny-listing and shares the tx that denylists the corresponding solver addresses. One can easily verify which solver addresses have been vouched for by the Project Blanc bonding pool (0xC96569Dc132ebB6694A5f0b781B33f202Da8AcE8) by using this query https://dune.com/queries/1541516. Specifically, the query shows the following two solver addresses have been vouched for by that pool: 0xbada55babee5d2b7f3b551f9da846838760e068c and 0xa5559c2e1302c5ce82582a6b1e4aec562c2fbcf4

(2) Once the deny-listing have been executed, then this CIP can be moved to the voting phase.

(3) The bonding pool owners (i.e., Project Blanc) commit to unvouch the relevant solver addresses AFTER the final payouts (currently scheduled every Tuesday) have been executed; by final, we mean the last payouts that would involve the two aforementioned solver addresses. We would also ask the Project Blanc team to post an update here with the txs that unvouch the two solver addresses.

(4) If the CIP passes, then the transfer of funds from the bonding pool to the relevant addresses will be automatically executed within 48 hours of the CIP passing.

Regarding (3) and (4), I would strongly suggest that we add the following to the text of the CIP: if the unvouching does not happen in the specified time window, then the CoW DAO signers are mandated to disable Osnap (which would otherwise automatically execute the transfers of funds) and NOT execute the transfer of funds.