Thank you so much for the proposal!
We already voted in favor of this proposal because,
- Having clear guidelines creates a binding framework for solvers to conduct transactions appropriately, which helps protect user interests.
- It is crucial for the protocol not only to aim at maximizing user benefits by design but also to implement safeguards to prepare for scenarios where users or the protocol might incur damages due to exceptional circumstances.
- Apart from the core team’s responsibility to monitor for violations, these rules do not impose an excessive burden on solvers or the protocol.
However, we wanted to touch on a point in the proposal that requires further clarification for us. Could you elaborate on this part? @harisang
In other cases, such as GlueX’s case, solvers directly involved in the incident are required to replenish their bonds by themselves.
The questions we have are;
- Could you confirm if this proposal suggests that CoW DAO might use its own funds to replenish the bond when the financial impact exceeds what the solver involved can compensate?
- If our understanding above is correct, could you also clarify whether there are predefined criteria to determine when a solver should provide additional compensation beyond their bond, and when the DAO should step in to cover the loss? Or is it expected that such decisions would be made on a case-by-case basis through governance discussions?